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CONFLICT OF INTEREST: A TOTALLY IGNORED
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL SANCTION AGAINST
CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT
MICHAEL I. SPAK*
PHILIP PARENTI**
'WHERE IS OUR Navy; why doesn't it fight?" was a familiar refrain
shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack. In fact, at the beginning of World
War II, our nation had no viable sea fighting force-the Navy had no
weapons with which to fight. "Where is our state's attorney; why
doesn't he fight?" is a possible refrain which could well be utilized
today. Today, however, in the war against governmental corruption,
the weapon does exist.
For over a century,' the Illinois State Legislature has explicitly
prohibited public officials from maintaining any interests in contracts
which conflict with their official functions. The legislature evidenced its
concern over conflict of interest in government by attaching criminal
sanctions to a violation of this statutory policy.' Although much
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1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 3 (1872) provided:
INTEREST IN CONTRACTS
§ 3. Not to be interested in contracts-Not to act as attorney to procure-Bribery
It shall not be lawful for any person, now or hereafter holding any office, either by
election or appointment, under the constitution of this state, to become in any manner
interested, either directly or indirectly, in his own name or in the name of any other
person or corporation, in any contract or the performance of any work in the making or
letting of which such officer may be called upon to act or vote. And it shall not be lawful
for any such officer to represent, either as agent or otherwise, any person, company or
corporation, in respect of any application or bid for any contract or work in regard to
which such officer may be called upon to vote. Nor shall any such officer take or
receive, or offer to take or receive, either directly or indirectly, any money or other thing
of value, as a gift or bribe, or a means of influencing his vote or action in his official
character; and any and all contracts made and procured in violation hereof, shall be null
and void [1872, April 9, Laws 1871-72, p. 612, § 31.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 4 (1872) provided:
§ 4. Penalties
Any alderman, member of a board of trustees, supervisor or county commissioner,
or person now or hereafter holding any office, either by election or appointment under
the constitution of this state, or any law now or hereafter in force in this state, who shall
violate any of the provisions of the preceding sections, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof may be punished by confinement in the
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litigation has ensued over the years as to whether certain contracts
were void as procured under a conflict of interest,3 the fact remains
that Illinois law enforcement authorities have never obtained a convic-
tion under the conflict of interest laws.4 A multitude of other states
similarly provide criminal statutes for conflict of interest by public
officials,' but it appears that only a paucity of criminal prosecutions
exists in this area, due in part to the difficulty of proving criminal
intent.6 However, local prosecutors should also share some of the
blame. As one scholarly review maintains: "[Wihere prosecutors owe
their positions to the patronage of local officials, their interest in
shielding the errant ways of their colleagues may sterilize the criminal
law." 7
It is inevitable that when state legislators and city council
aldermen pursue outside financial endeavors to supplement their public
income, the probability of conflict between private and public econom-
penitentiary for a term not less than one year nor more than five years, or fined in a sum
not less than $200 nor more than $1,000, or both, in the discretion of the court before
which such conviction shall be had; and in addition thereto, any office or official position
held by any person or persons so convicted shall, by the fact of such conviction, become
vacant, and shall be so declared as part of the judgment of the court: and the person or
persons so convicted shall be disqualified from holding any office or position of trust and
confidence in this state for the period of two years from and after the date of such
conviction [1872, April 9, Laws 1871-72, p. 612, § 41.
3. Peabody v. Sanitary District, 330 I1. 250, 161 N.E 519 (1928); People v. Sperry, 314
Ill. 205, 145 N.E. 344 (1924); Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corp., 34 Ill. App. 2d 100, 180
N,E.2d 731 (1962); Panozzo v. City of Rockford, 306 11. App. 443, 28 N.E.2d 748 (1940):
McCarthy v. City of Bloomington, 127 Ill. App 215 (1906).
4. There are no reported Illinois appellate cases concerned with a criminal prosecution for
conflict of interest under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 3 or ch. 24, § 3-14-4. The sole discovered
case which remotely bears on this issue is People v. Hogan, 257 Ill. App. 206, transferred. 335
Ill. 463, 167 N.E. 18 (1930).
In Hogan, a quo warranto petition was filed against certain village officials praying for
removal from office for the misappropriation of village funds by voting the same to themselves in
payment of goods and merchandise sold to the village. Section 37 of the Commission Form of
Government Act, CAHILL'S ILL. STAT. ch. 24, § 360 provided that
... no officer of any such city or village shall be interested, directly or indirectly, in
any contract or job for work or materials, or profits thereof, or services to be furnished
or performed for the city or village, and that any violation of that section shall be
deemed a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500
and shall be ground for removal from office or employment . . . 257 I1. App. at 208.
It was held that since section 37 only provided that a violation of the statute shall be ground for
removal from office, the non-self executing statute required a previous conviction for removal.
257 Il. App. at 212 (emphasis added). Consequently, the village officials could not be removed
from office under a quo warranto petition where there was no prior determination of violation of
the law.
This technical defense has been eliminated by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 3-14-5 (1973) and ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 4 (1973), which both provide for automatic vacation of office by the
offender.
5. See Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Government Contracts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 361
(1957).
6. Id. at 366-67.
7. Id. at 367.
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ic interest increases.8 This is attested to by the ever-expanding number
of federal convictions of state and local public officials-which reveals
blatant official corruption rampant in Illinois.9 This corruption is no
less apparent in conflicts of interest maintained by state and municipal
officers.' 0
This article is constructed to review conflict of interest litigation in
Illinois and to ascertain the feasibility of prompting local law enforce-
ment authorities, such as county state's attorneys, to enforce the penal
sanctions that now exist." One will observe that the Illinois conflict of
interest statutes have thus far been used exclusively in civil litigation to
void certain contracts and business dealings of public officials. The
extensive civil litigation in this area will be examined to derive the
8. Chaet, The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act-A Step Ahead Toward Better Govern-
ment, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 302, 306 (1972).
9. Convictions of former governor of Illinois and State Revenue Director: United States v.
Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3184 (1974): village trustees: United
States v. Peskin, No. 73 CR 765 (N.D. Il1. 1973) appeal pending, No. 74-1450 (7th Cir.
1974); Cook County Clerk: United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1974). Chicago
aldermen: United States v. Keane, No. 74 CR 359 (N.D. Ill.), appeal pending. No. 74-1979
(7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Staszuck, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974): United States v.
Wigoda, No. 74 CR 291 (N.D. Ill.), appeal pending, No. 74-2007 (7th Cir. 1974): United
States v. Potempa, No. 73 CR 736 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (guilty plea): United States v. Kuta, No. 74
CR 22 (N.D. Ill.), appeal pending, No. 74-1920 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Jambrone.
No. 72 CR 805 (N.D. II1. 1972), remanded with instructions to dismiss, No. 73-1514 (7th Cir.
1973).
10. See Conflict of Interest Laws Commission, Ethical Standards in Illinois State
Government 15-16, 19-30 (Springfield: The Commission 1967); Chaet, The Illinois Governmen-
tal Ethics Act-A Step Ahead Toward Better Government, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 302 (1972).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 3, 4 (1973):
INTEREST IN CONTRACTS
§ 3. Not to be interested in contracts-Not to act as attorney to procure-Bribery
No person holding any office, either by election or appointment under the laws or
constitution of this state, may be in any manner interested, either directly or indirectly,
in his own name or in the name of any other person, association, trust or corporation, in
any contract or the performance of any work in the making or letting of which such
officer may be called upon to act or vote. No such officer may represent, either as agent
or otherwise, any person, association, trust or corporation. with respect to any
application or bid for any contract or work in regard to which such officer may be called
upon to vote. Nor may any such officer take or receive, or offer to take or receive, either
directly or indirectly, any money or other thing of value as a gift or bribe or means of
influencing his vote or action in his official character. Any contract made and procured
in violation hereof is void. As amended 1949, May 6. Laws 1949. p. 1162, § I.
§ 4. Violations
Any alderman, member of a board of trustees, supervisor or county commissioner,
or other person holding any office, either by election or appointment under the laws or
constitution of this state, who violates any provision of the preceding sections is guilty of
a Class 4 felony and in addition thereto, any office or official position held by any
person so convicted shall become vacant, and shall be so declared as part of the
judgment of court. Amended by 1949. May 6, Laws 1949, p. 1162, § 1; P.A. 77-2721,
§ 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1973.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 3-14-4 and 3-14-5 (1973):
§ 3-14-4. Pecuniary interests in contracts-Prohibition
No municipal officer shall be interested, directly, or indirectly, in any contract.
work, or business of the municipality or in the sale of any article. whenever the expense.
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fundamental rudiments of a conflict of interest violation in order to
determine the propriety of criminal prosecutions for this offense.
Criminal prosecutions in three separate states, as well as federal
prosecutions, will also be examined to construct a framework of
elements upon which an Illinois criminal indictment can be based for
conflict of interest by Illinois public officials. The purpose of this
examination is to assist Illinois state's attorneys by calling the conflict
of interest sanction to their attention. Consequently, a thorough
examination of conflict of interest in Illinois is the task at hand.
THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATUTES
Chapter 24, section 3-14-4 and chapter 102, section 3 provide the
focus for Illinois judicial interpretation of public official conflict of
interest. While section 3-14-4 prohibits municipal officers from holding
an interest in a contract whenever city treasury funds are used to pay
for the contract, chapter 102, section 3 prohibits any public official,
elected or appointed under the laws of Illinois, from maintaining a
contractual interest in which the officer may be called upon to act or
price, or consideration of the contract, work, business, or sale is paid either from the
treasury or by any assessment levied by any statute or ordinance. No municipal officer
shall be interested, directly or indirectly, in the purchase of any property which (1)
belongs to the municipality, or (2) is sold for taxes or assessments, or (3) is sold by
virtue of legal process at the suit of the municipality. 1961, May 29, Laws 196 1, p. 576,
§ 3-14-4.
§ 3-14-5. Misconduct of municipal officers-Penalty
Every municipal officer who is guilty of a palpable omission of duty, or who is guilty
of willful and corrupt oppression, malconduct, or misfeasance in the discharge of the
duties of his office, shall be guilty of a business offense and on conviction, shall be fined
not exceeding $1,000. The court in which such conviction is had shall enter an order
removing the convicted officer from office. Amended by P.A. 77-2500, § I, eff. Jan. 1,
1973.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 4-8-6 (1973):
§ 4-8-6. Pecuniary interest in contracts-Free Service
No officer or employee elected or appointed under this article shall be interested
directly or indirectly, in any contract for work or materials, or profits thereof, or services
to be furnished or performed for the municipality or for any person operating a public
utility wholly or partly within the territorial limits of the municipality. However, in
municipalities of less than 15,000 population any officer or employee may provide
materials, merchandise, property, services, labor by contract or otherwise, if such items
are submitted to sealed bids and the contract covering such items is awarded to the
lowest bidder.
No such officer or employee shall request, accept, or receive directly or indirectly,
from any person owning, operating, or leasing within the territorial limits of the
municipality, and public utility, or any water craft leaving or entering or operating within
the municipality any service or transportation upon terms more favorable than are
granted to the public generally, or any employment, for hire or otherwise, or any free
service or transportation, either for himself or any other person.
A violation of this section is a petty offense. A conviction shall effect a forfeiture of
the office or employment.
The prohibition of free transportation shall not apply to policemen or firemen in
uniform, nor shall this section affect any free service to municipal officers or employees
provided by any franchise or license, granted prior to March 9. 1910. Amended by
1965, Aug. 20, Laws 1965, p. 3167, § 1, P.A. 77-2500, § I, eff. Jan. I, 1973.
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vote. In either case, whether treasury funds are used or whether a
public official acts or votes on his contract, it is a principle of public
policy and common law that contracts between public officials and the
governing body are void.'"
In Sherlock v. Village of Winnetka, 3 a case decided prior to the
1872 enactment of chapter 102, section 3, the court held invalid the
sale of municipal bonds by the village council to its own members. The
sale was declared "void, on the ground that no man can contract with
himself. 1 4 A significant treatise concerning the illegality of this form
of municipal contract provides:
The rationale of this application of the principle is that public
officers are in a fiduciary relation to the government which employs
them. When a representative of a public body is influenced in his
official acts by any personal interest, beyond the general interest
every citizen has in good government, he is no longer acting solely
for the public, which is his duty. To prevent unjust enrichment of
such officials, the illegal contract is held void.'"
Chapter 24, Section 3-14-4
The general purpose of chapter 24, section 3-14-4 is to prohibit
municipal officers from holding beneficial interests in municipal con-
tracts, for which city treasury funds are paid.' 6 In Village of Dwight v.
Palmer,7 a clerk of the board of trustees could not retain village funds
paid to him for publishing village ordinances. The court responded:
"Appellee (Palmer) has received money out of the village treasury
under an illegal contract, and under such circumstances as render it
against the policy of the law for him to retain it."' 8 It was also
determined in Palmer that a village official's resignation will not
validate a contract procured under a conflict of interest. 9
12. Panozzo v. City of Rockford, 306 Ill. App. 443, 28 N.E.2d 748 (1940); Koons v.
Richardson, 227 I1. App. 477 (1923): McCarthy v. City of Bloomington, 127 IIl. App. 215
(1906).
13. 59 111. 389 (1871).
14. Id. at 399.
15. Ancel, Municipal Contracts, 1961 U. ILL. L.F, 357, 366.
16. Municipal officers under § 3-14-4 include: city council aldermen. McCarthy v. City of
Bloomington, 127 111. App. 215 (1906); city judge, Damron v. City of Eldorado, 300 111. App.
481, 21 N.E.2d 641 (1939): city engineer, Koons v. Richardson, 127 III. App. 477 (1923);
village clerk, Village of Dwight v. Palmer, 74 Ill. 295 (1874). See also note 29 infra.
17. 74 111. 295 (1874).
18. Id. at 299.
19. But see White v. City of Alton, 149 I1. 626, 37 N.E. 96 (1894), which held that
resignation will qualify a former alderman to bid on a contract authorized while the bidder was a
council member.
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The court in McCarthy v. City of Bloomington0 declared a
contract, whereby the city paid funds to an alderman for legal services,
violative of chapter 24, sections 5 and 7 prohibiting members of the
city council from being interested in contracts paid from the city
treasury. The court explained the foundation for such laws. "Sections
5 and 7 . . . in so far as they prohibit officers of municipal
corporations from being beneficially interested in contracts for the
performance of services and furnishing of supplies to such corpora-
tions, are merely declaratory of the common law, which, upon
considerations of the highest public policy, affirms such contracts to be
illegal." 21
In 1940, an Illinois appellate court 2 applied the revised conflict of
interest statute, chapter 24, section 90,23 to prohibit the chief valuator
of the board of local improvements from recovering overtime salary for
other work performed for the board. Twelve years later, in People v.
Adduci,2 4 the Illinois Supreme Court articulated the common law
definition of public official interest forbidden under chapter 102,
section 3 and chapter 24, section 9-91:25
The interest against which the prohibition is leveled is such an
interest as prevents or tends to prevent the public official from giving
to the public that impartial and faithful service which he is in duty
bound to render and which the public has every right to demand and
receive. Not every interest is a bad or corrupt interest. The desire of
every public official to serve the public faithfully necessarily requires
him to take a keen interest in the affairs of his office and the
prohibition is manifestly not leveled against this interest. Whether or
20. 127 111. App. 215 (1906).
21. Id. at 217. See also Damron v. City of Eldorado, 300 III. App. 481, 21 N.E.2d 641
(1939).
22. Harry Goldstine Realty Co. v. Chicago, 306 III. App. 556, 29 N.E.2d 283 (1940).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 90 (1939):
90. Officers not to be interested in contracts, etc. § 7. No officer shall be directly
or indirectly interested in any contract, work or business of the city, or the sale of any
article, the expense, price or consideration of which is paid from the treasury, or by any
assessment levied by any act or ordinance; nor in the purchase of any real estate or
other property belonging to the corporation, or which shall be sold for taxes or
assessments, or by virtue of legal process at the suit of said corporation.
In 1941 chapter 24, section 90 was revised to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 9-91 (1941):
9-91. Officers not to be interested in contracts. No municipal officer shall be
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract, work, or business of the municipality,
or in the sale of any article, whenever the expense, price, or consideration of the
contract, work, business, or sale is paid either from the treasury or by any assessment
levied by any statute or ordinance. No municipal officer shall be interested, directly or
indirectly, in the purchase of any property which () belongs to the municipality, or (2)
is sold for taxes or assessments, or (3) is sold by virtue of legal process at the suit of the
municipality.
24. 412 I11. 621, 108 N.E.2d 1 (1952).
25. Section 9-91 (see note 23) was revised in 1961 to the present statute, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 24, § 3-14-4 (1973).
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not the interest in any given case comes within the prohibition of the
statute may well become a question of construction for the court in
view of all the facts and circumstances shown in the particular case
. . . .In the present case it is alleged that there was a personal
financial interest, and certainly, such an interest would come within
the prohibition of the law . . . .[Tihe question really is whether the
town officer by reason of his interest is placed 'in a situation of
temptation to serve his own personal interests to the prejudice of the
interests of those for whom the law authorized and required him to
act in the premises as an official.' Nor is it necessary that the statute
should enumerate the various kinds of interest which may come
within its terms . . . .The objectionable interest could consist of
any one of numerous interests which would be inconsistent with and
repugnant to the duty of the officer to render to the public faithful
and impartial service.2 6
In Huszgagh v. City of Oakbrook Terrace," the court held that a
city contract to pay a city attorney one-third of the sales tax revenue to
handle legal matters relating to certain annexation proceedings con-
travened chapter 24, section 3-14-4. Likewise under a statutory
precursor of section 3-14-4,28 a contract providing for compensation of
a city engineer at a percentage cost of certain street improvements was
held invalid.29
Pawchak v. Long30 held that an office equipment company was
not prevented from contracting with the city only because it was
deemed an independent contractor and not a municipal officer.
However, the court explained the meaning of a "municipal officer"
under section 3-14-4. "Article 3 of the Cities and Villages Act wherein
the disputed statute is found provides that the term municipal officer
refers to elected or appointed officials whose duties are continuing and
not limited to a single transaction. The statute does not purport to
apply to an independent contractor."3 Therefore it is clear that all
26. People v. Adduci, 412 11. 621, 627, 108 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1952) (citations omitted).
27. 41 111. 2d 387, 43 N.E.2d 831 (1969).
28. CAHILL'S ILL. STAT. ch. 24, § 80.
29. Koons v. Richardson, 227 I1. App. 477 (1923). In Koons, a city engineer was found to
be a city officer within the meaning of the statute. Municipal officers include: president of village
board, Baumrucker v. Brink, 373 Ill. 82, 25 N.E.2d 51 (1939); clerk of probate court, Cook
County v. Sennott, 136 I1. 314, 26 N.E. 491 (1891); clerk of municipal court, People v. Gill, 30
Ill. App. 2d 32, 173 N.E.2d 568 (1961); members of board of election commissioners. People v.
Board of Comr's of Cook County, 260 III. 345, 103 N.E. 282 (1913); county jury
commissioners, Barnett v. Cook County, 320 I1. 227, 150 N.E. 672 (1926): municipal judges,
People ex rel. Lyle v. City of Chicago, 360 III. 25, 195 N.E. 451 (1935). See also note 16 supra.
30. 91 111. App. 2d 218, 234 N.E.2d 85 (1968).
31. Id. at 220, 234 N.E.2d at 86.
Note that ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-18 (1973) provides:
"Public officer" means a person who is elected to office pursuant to statute, or who
is appointed to an office which is established, and the qualifications and duties of which
are prescribed, by statute, to discharge a public duty for the State or any of its political
subdivisions.
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elected or appointed municipal officers in Illinois are within the
purview of chapter 24, section 3-14-4.
Chapter 102, Section 3
Chapter 102, section 3 expressly prohibits all Illinois public
officials from holding any interest in contracts in which they may be
called upon to act or vote, irrespective of whether state or municipal
treasury funds are used to procure the contract. The court in People v.
Sperry32 makes it clear that the statute is violated even if the state or
the municipality is not deprived of economic benefit:
If the contract is one that the statutes declare to be void under
the law, we must declare it void, even though it may further appear
that the contract was as good a contract in behalf of the city as it
could have obtained-that is, that the consideration for the work
performed was as low as could have been obtained. If we attach any
significance to the words used by the statute, 'directly or indirectly
interested in the contract,' we think the conclusion cannot be
escaped that the officers of the city, who are also employees of the
contractor, must be considered as indirectly interested in the
contract without regard to the fact that they derived no direct
benefits from the contract itself. They would be more than human if
they could make the same fair and impartial contract with the
contractor, as they could with another party with whom they had no
relation by way of employment or otherwise."
Furthermore, it is irrelevant whether an interested officer takes
part in the letting of the contract or votes thereon. 4 In Peabody v.
Sanitary District," the treasurer and financial adviser of the sanitary
district was also an employee of a company under contract with the
city. The count propounded definitions of official and ministerial action
in order to deal with the official's defense that he was a ministerial
officer who took no active part in the contract. "Official action is
judicial where it is the result of judgment or discretion. It is ministerial
when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the
execution of a set task, and when the law which imposes it prescribes
and defines the time, manner, and occasion of its performance with
such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion. '"36
Despite Schmidt's, the financial adviser's, testimony that he had no
knowledge of the proscribed contract and that he was not even in a
position to vote on the contract, the court invalidated the contract
32. 314 11. 205, 145 N.E. 344 (1924).
33. Id. at 209, 145 N.E. at 345-46.
34. Peabody v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 330 Il1. 250, 161 N.E. 519 (1928).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 257, 161 N.E. at 522.
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under chapter 102, section 3. The Peabody court elucidated the
relevant portion of the statute which prohibits the interested party from
being in a position where he "may be called upon to act or vote:""
While his testimony is to the effect that he (public official) had
nothing to do with making or letting the contract to the ballast
company, this is quite beside the point. If his duties were such that
he could or might have been called upon to take any action in the
matter of making a contract, that fact disqualified him from having
any interest in the contract, either directly or indirectly, and such a
contract was void.38
While the evidence showed that the board of trustees did not seek the
interested officer's financial advice in the contract, it was his duty to
give that advice had the board sought it. "The question is, not what
Schmidt (interested officer) did, but what he might be called upon to
do, which determines the application of the statute. ' 39 Therefore, the
court struck down the contract notwithstanding that Schmidt's compa-
ny was the lowest bidder. Furthermore, since Schmidt was the
financial adviser of the sanitary district, and required to make such
report as the trustees directed, he was not entitled to the defense of
being a purely ministerial officer even though he took no affirmative
action in the contract with the city.
Neither favorable treatment nor affirmative participation is neces-
sary to proscribe municipal officers from being interested in contracts
with the city.40 Nor must the municipal officer vote or be required to
vote on the contract so long as he may be called upon to "act" on it.4
In Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corporation,42 city trustees, who
were employees or officials of an engineering firm, unanimously voted
to award a utility company a thirty-year license. Since the engineering
company was under direct contract with the utilities company, the
utilities contract was voided. However, prerequisite to any contract
denial was proof of the engineering company's pecuniary interest in the
contract.43 Since the engineering firm received $80 per lot from the
37. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 3 (1973).
38. Peabody v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 330 Il1. 250, 258-59, 161 N.E. 519. 522-523
(1928).
39. Id. at 259, 161 N.E. at 523.
40. Id.
41. Town of City of Peoria v. Rausckolb, 333 III. App. 411, 78 N.E.2d 123 (1948);
Peabody v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 330 111. 250, 161 N.E. 519 (1928).
42. 34 111. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731 (1962).
43. Panozzo v. City of Rockford, 306 III. App. 443, 28 N.E.2d 748 (1940). The
conflicting interest must be certain, definable and pecuniary or proprietary. Panozzo v. City of
Rockford, id. See Furlong v. South Park Com'rs, 340 II1. 363, 172 N.E. 757 (1930), wherein
the park commissioners' allocation of a building to a not-for-profit corporation of which they were
ex officio trustees was held not to violate section 3 as no pecuniary interest existed.
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city for services rendered in the project, sufficient economic interest
could be attributed to the city trustees to void the contract. The court
in Kruse voided the contract solely on the basis of chapter 102, section
3.
It is obvious that the courts in all of the aforementioned cases
invalidating municipal contracts under chapter 102, section 3, have
determined that a conflict of interest existed between certain municipal
officers and the city in derogation of the statute.
Official Misconduct, Chapter 38, Section 33-3
The official misconduct statute44 and its predecessors have been
implemented by local prosecutors for a wide range of offenses. 5 It is
significant that the statute by definition 46 permits proof of another
substantive offense. 4' It would seem that section 33-3, with its
attendant penal sanction, could be a forceful tool in curbing substantive
44. § 33-3. Official Misconduct
A public officer or employee commits misconduct when, in his official capacity, he
commits any of the following acts:
(a) Intentionally or recklessly fails to perform any mandatory duty as required by
law; or
(b) Knowingly performs an act which he knows he is forbidden by law to perform;
or
(c) With intent to obtain a personal advantage for himself or another, he performs
an act in excess of his lawful authority; or
(d) Solicits or knowingly accepts for the performance of any act a fee or reward
which he knows is not authorized by law.
A public officer or employee convicted of violating any provision of this Section
forfeits his office or employment. In addition, he commits a Class 4 felony.
Amended by P.A. 77-2638, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1973.
45. Police bribery: People v. Fleming, 50 Il1. 2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 872 (1971), People v.
Gralewski, 270 N.E.2d 566 (1971), People v. Smith, 57 Ill. App. 2d 74, 206 N.E.2d 463
(1965); Police extortion: People v. Begley, 270 I1. App. 197 (1933); Perjury: People v.
McGreal, 4 Ill. App. 3d 312, 278 N.E.2d 504 (1971); Omission of duty: People v. Campbell. 3
Ill. App. 3d 984, 279 N.E.2d 123 (1972) (Sanitary district trustees failure to award contract to
lowest bidder), People v. Gill, 30 I1. App. 2d 332, 173 N.E.2d 568 (1961) (Municipal court
clerk's failure to report intoxicated driving convictions to Secretary of State), People v. Reiner. 6
Ill. 2d 337, 129 N.E.2d 159 (1955) (Police magistrate's failure to report intoxicated driving
convictions to Secretary of State); Misfeasance: People v. Haycraft, 3 I1. App. 3d 974, 278
N.E.2d 877 (1972) (township collector's misappropriation of funds); People v. Crosson, 30 Il1.
App. 2d 57, 173 N.E.2d 552 (1961) (Court referee's discharge of a defendant without
examining complaint); People v. Blameuser, 321 Ill. App. 307, 52 N.E.2d 818 (1944) (Village
president encouraging horse betting); People v. Hughey, 382 Il. 136, 47 N.E.2d 77 (1943)
(Misappropriation of city funds); People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1915)
(Misappropriation of city funds).
46. Subparagraphs a, b, c and d of section 33-3 all require the omission or performance of
an act forbidden by law.
47. See note 45 supra for bribery, extortion and perjury cases-all separate substantive
offenses. For example, police bribery can he separately prosecuted under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 33-1 (1973), and police extortion can be separately prosecuted under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38. §
16-1 (c) (1973).
74 CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
offenses of conflict of interest.48  Unfortunately, this tool has been
overlooked by law enforcement authorities.
However, the special difficulty in proving criminal intent under
section 33-3 may justifiably cause apprehension. A recent Illinois
Appellate Court reversed a public official's conviction for illegally
disbursing attorney's fees and for entering into contracts without
submission to the lowest bidder. 49 The court held in People v.
Campbell5 that knowledge that the performed act was in violation of
the law was a requisite element of section 33-3.1t Campbell thus
negates the principle that every person is presumed to know the law,
and requires an allegation and proof of special knowledge on the part
of those charged under section 33-3.12
It may be concluded that if prosecutors can prove a defendant's
"special knowledge," the accused may be indicted on counts of official
misconduct and conflict of interest. If special knowledge or specific
intent cannot be shown, prosecutors may resort to an indictment solely
grounded upon the general intent conflict of interest statutes. 3
STATE CRIMINAL APPLICATION OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATUTES
As was previously mentioned, 4 there are no reported criminal
conflict of interest convictions in Illinois. Therefore, a review of the
criminal conflict law in three geographically disparate states can only
assist in a determination of Illinois policy."
New Jersey
Over sixty years ago, a public official's conviction was affirmed
for violation of a statute analogous to Illinois' chapter 102, section 3.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 3 (1973): ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24. § 3-14-4 (1973).
49. People v. Campbell, 3 Ill. App. 3d 984. 279 N.E.2d 123 (1972).
50. Id.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3(c) (1973) provides:
Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense or knowledge of the
existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an offense, is not an element of
the offense unless the statute clearly defines it as such.
Chapter 38, section 33-3 clearly defines knowledge as an element of the offense.
52. In Campbell, conviction was not affirmed since the defendant mistakenly believed he
was empowered to enter into emergency contracts without submission to the lowest bidder. See
People v. Hughey, 382 Ill. 136, 47 N.E.2d 77 (1943) which held that palpable omission of duty
requires intentional substantial failure to perform duties imposed by law, and not mere failure
through mistake.
53. The intent requirement of chapter 102. sections 3 and 4 and chapter 24. sections 3-14-
4 and 3-14-5 will be discussed in the following subheading entitled, State Criminal Application of
Conflict of Interest Statutes.
54. See note 4 supra.
55. Three states-New Jersey, Tennessee and North Dakota-were randomly selected to
illustrate the criminal application of conflict of interest statutes. It is beyond the scope of this
article to review the entire national spectrum.
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In State v. Kuehnle,56 a board member of the city water commission,
Kuehnle, was a stockholder in a company under contract with the
water commission. The court held that a defendant's corrupt intent was
a requisite element to an interested officer's selfish and pecuniary
concern in the contract. 7 However, corrupt intent could be imputed
from a number of factors including financial interest, favorable treat-
ment, and concealment." The court continued that even the ownership
of only one share of stock could imply criminal liability so long as
corrupt intent was present.5 9 It was noted that an official's failure to
vote on the interested contract was immaterial since even an adverse
vote could be a sham to conceal interest. 60
The controlling case in New Jersey today, State v. Lambertson,61
interpreted Kuehnle as holding that the state need only prove criminal
intent or mens rea and not specific intent, 62 for a criminal violation of
the conflict of interest statutes. 63 The Lamberston court explained that
the criminal intent to voluntarily do the wrongful act is all that is
required where the statute does not mandate specific intent.64 New
Jersey law does not require a showing that the defendant was
conscious that his acts were unlawful. The court articulated:
The ordained inquiry is whether the act condemned was
committed with full knowledge of the facts, in a conscious and
purposeful manner, without legal justification or excuse. It must not
be the product of inadvertence or negligence or any state of mind
other than a free and untrammeled will. This is the definition of
criminal intent embodied in the words willfully and maliciously, as
used in this statute. The accused must intend to act in the way
proscribed by the statute, but it is immaterial that he does not know
or believe his conduct violates the law.
Even positive belief that the act is lawful should not exempt the
doer from criminal responsibility. Consciousness of unlawfulness is
not essential.61
56. 85 N.J.L. 220, 88 A.1085 (1913).
57. Id. at 226, 88 A. at 1087.
58. Id. at 228-229, 88 A. at 1089.
59. Id. at 226, 88 A. at 1088.
60. Id. at 229, 88 A. at 1089.
61. l10N.J. Super. 137, 264 A.2d 729 (1970).
62. Id. at 142, 264 A.2d at 731.
63. Defendant Lambertson was convicted under N.J.S.A. 2A:135-8(c) (1969) which
provides:
Any member of a board of chosen freeholders or of the governing body of a
municipality, or of a board of education in any school district, who:
c. Is directly or indirectly interested in furnishing any good chattels, supplies or
property to or for the county, municipality or school district, the agreement or contract
for which is made or the expense or consideration of which is paid by the board or
governing body of which such member is a part. ...
Is guilty of a misdemeanor.
64. 110 N.J. Super. 137, 142-143, 264 A.2d 729, 732'(1970).
65. Id. at 143, 264 A.2d at 732 (emphasis added).
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Therefore, a voluntary performance of an act prohibited by the New
Jersey conflict of interest statute satisfies the criminal intent require-
ment.6 6 Ignorance of the law or good faith is no defense to this non-
specific intent crime. Although the state offered no direct evidence of
Lambertson's knowledge of the contract, an inference of defendant's
knowledge and intent was drawn from the extent of his financial
interest in the company.67 It seems that Illinois cases which have
voided contracts under conflict of interest based upon pecuniary
interest could also be implemented to show criminal intent. 61
Tennessee
In Tennessee, contracts procured by public officials under a
conflict of interest are void, and an officer may be removed from office
under their ouster law, if willful misconduct is shown.69 In State v.
Miller ° a complaint was brought against the chairman of the county
board of education for renting his own busses for the board in violation
of state conflict of interest statutes. 1 Although this was a quo
warranto suit brought by taxpayers without the intervention of the
district attorney, the court pointed out that sections 12-401 and 402
are enforceable by indictment under the common law.' 2
Miller is significant for its distinction of the civil remedy of
voiding the contract as opposed to the criminal penalty of ouster from
office. In quoting from State ex rel. Citizens of Lawrenceburg v.
Perkinson,'3 the court declared:
By a uniform line of decisions, contracts in violations of the
statute have been declared void. This is true though the official
66. N.J.S.A. 2A:135-8(c) (1969), the current New Jersey statute requiring the use of
governing body funds in an interested contract, is analagous to ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 3-14-4
(1973).
67. State v. Lambertson, 110 N.J. Super. 137, 147, 264 A.2d 729, 734 (1970).
68. See Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corporation, 34 Ill. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731
(1962). See also Panozzo v. City of Rockford, 306 Ill. App. 443, 28 N.E.2d 748 (1940).
69. State v. Miller, 202 Tenn. 498, 304 S.W.2d 654 (1957).
70. Id.
71. T.C.A. §§ 12-401, 12-402 provide:
12-401. Personal interest of officers prohibited.
It shall not be lawful for any officer, committeeman, director or other person whose
duty it is to vote for, let out, overlook, or in any manner to superintend, any work or any
contract in which any municipal corporation, county, or the state, shall or may be
interested in any such contract.
12-402. Penalty for unlawful interest.
Should any person, acting as such officer, committeeman, director, or other person
referred to in § 12-401, be or become directly or indirectly interested in any such
contract, he shall forfeit all pay and compensation therefor. Such officer shall be
dismissed from such office he then occupies, and be ineligible for the same or a similar
position for ten (10) years.
72. State v. Miller, 202 Tenn. 498, 505-06, 304 S.W.2d 654, 656 (1957).
73. 159 Tenn. 442, 445, 19 S.W.2d 254, 255 (1929).
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contracted in good faith. But where the act is invoked as basis for
ouster under chapter 11, Acts of 1915, a distinction must be drawn
between the acts done in good faith but unenforcible because the
statute makes them so, and acts of willful misconduct, as where a
public officer corruptly and fraudulently abuses his powers in making
the contract. In the first instance, the contract could not be enforced.
In the latter, the officer may be indicted for official corruption and
removed from office under the Ouster Law. The remedies are
concurrent.
4
Thus, a public official's corrupt or criminal intent to violate the conflict
of interest statutes will subject him to criminal indictment as well as
negation of the illegal contract.
North Dakota
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has held that a criminal
conflict of interest statute" may apply to a public official who, in his
official capacity, contracts with a corporation of which he is a
substantial stockholder.7 6 The prohibited interest must be personal and
not merely held in a representative capacity such as a trustee.77 The
court in State v. Robinson78 noted that where the dual corporate
capacity of officer and stockholder surfaces, the prohibited interest is
more apparent.79 However, criminal intent would be an element
additional to economic or proprietary interest when criminal sanctions
are imposed.80
The current North Dakota statute8' was the basis of a township
board member's conviction for holding a beneficial interest in a
highway construction contract procured with the township.82 In re-
sponse to the official's defense of good faith, the court in State v.
Pyle83 said: "[H]e [defendant] testified that he did not know or was
74. State v. Miller, 202 Tenn. 498. 510, 304 S.W.2d 654, 659 (1957) (citations omitted).
75. Compiled Laws N.D. § 9829 (1913) provides:
Officer's fraud. Every public officer, being authorized to sell or lease any property
or make any contract in his official capacity, who voluntarily becomes interested
individually in such sale, lease or contract, directly or indirectly, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
76. State v. Robinson, 71 N.D. 463, 2 N.W.2d 183 (1942).
77. Id. at 471, 2 N.W.2d at 189.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 468, 2 N.W.2d at 187.
80. Id. at 472, 2 N.W.2d at 189.
81. N.D.R.C. § 12-10-06 (1973) provides:
12-10-06. Personal interest in contract by public officer-Punishment-Exception-
Every public officer authorized to sell or lease any property, or make any contract
in his official capacity, who contrary to law voluntarily becomes interested individually
in such sale, lease, or contract, directly or indirectly, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
82. State v. Pyle, 71 N.W.2d 342 (1955).
83. Id.
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not aware of the fact that there was a law such as section 12-1006.
However it is a well-established rule that ignorance of the law excuses
no one and it follows therefore that defendant's ignorance of the
existence of Section 12-1006 was not a defense to the offense with
which he was charged. ' '8 4 State v. Pyle85 also stands for the proposition
that the legislature in exercising its police powers may prohibit a
specific act under criminal penalty. "The doing of the prohibited act
constitutes the crime, and the purity of the motive by which the act is
prompted, and the knowledge or ignorance of its criminal character,
are immaterial on the issue of guilt." 6 Consequently, the criminal
intent or mens rea to do the proscribed act is sufficient for culpability,
whereas specific intent to violate the statute is immaterial.
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE THREE-STATE REVIEW
The foregoing three-state analysis illustrates that criminal prose-
cution under chapter 102, section 3 and chapter 24, section 3-14-4 is
indeed feasible in Illinois. Proof of criminal intent is surmountable
under these general intent statutes.8 " It is certainly a constitutional
principle that due process requires intent to be an essential element of
a crime. 8  However, the only criminal intent necessary for proof is that
which is required by Illinois Statute.89
A defendant's intent to commit a conflict of interest offense can
be imputed from a variety of factors including financial (e.g. stockhold-
er) or proprietary (e.g. corporate officer) interest.90 The presence of
these determinants illustrative of criminal intent would negate the
defenses of lack of knowledge or that the public official was purely a
ministerial officer in the letting of the prohibited contract.9 If a
84. Id. at 346.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 346.
87. Since Illinois conflict of interest statutes do not specifically require knowledge on the
part of an accused that his conduct constitutes a statutory offense. chapter 102. section 3 and
chapter 24, section 3-14-4 are not specific intent offenses. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38. § 4-3(c)
(1973), set out in note 51 supra.
88. Landty v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968, (N.D. ]a.), dismissed, 393 U.S. 220 (1968).
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-I (1973):
A material element of every offense is voluntary act, which includes an omission to
perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically
capable of performing.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4 (1973):
A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or
engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious
objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.
90. See State v. Lambertson, 110 N.J. Super. 137, 264 A.2d 729 (1970); State v.
Robinson, 71 N.D. 463, 2 N.W.2d 183 (1942); State v. Kuehnle, 85 N.J.L. 220, 88 A. 1085
(1913).
91. See Peabody v. Sanitary District, 330 III. 250, 161 N.E. 519 (1928).
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municipal officer intends to hold a beneficial interest in a contract for
which municipal treasury funds are used or for which he may be
required to act or vote, he should be held criminally responsible.92
FEDERAL INTERVENTION
Conflict of interest by Illinois public officials has not gone
unnoticed by federal law enforcement authorities. Chicago Alderman
Thomas Keane has recently been convicted for engaging in a mail
fraud scheme to buy and sell tax delinquent properties that were
subject to vote before the city council of which Keane was a voting
member. 93 The federal indictment incorporated the Illinois conflict of
interest statutes. 94 The presiding federal district court judge, Honora-
ble Bernard M. Decker, ruled that the Illinois statutes served to define
the standard of conduct expected of the defendant, and bore upon the
defendant's knowledge and intent to defraud. 9 Judicial notice of state
statutes in a federal prosecution may be an effective prosecutorial
device in defining a public official's duty.96
Furthermore, in the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of conviction of
the former Clerk of Cook County in United States v. Barrett,97
illustrated the significance of Illinois statutory policy in regard to its
public officials. In Barrett, the county clerk received secret insurance
brokerage commissions on voting machines while he procured the
insurance for such machines on behalf of the county. Thus, a public
official may be convicted of mail fraud in depriving citizens of his loyal
and faithful services by committing a conflict of interest.98
92. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 3-14-4, 3-14-5 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 3. 4
(1973).
93. United States v. Keane, No. 74 CR 359 (N.D. III. 1974), appeal pending, No. 74-
1979 (7th Cir. 1974). Conviction was obtained for conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), and
mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
94. ILL. REv. STAT. ch 24, § 3-14-4 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 3 (1973).
95. United States v. Keane, No. 74 CR 359 (N.D. II., Aug. 15, 1974).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
846 (1968); United States v. McCormick, 309 F.2d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 911 (1963); Lemp Brewing Co. v. Ems Brewing Co., 164 F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1947)
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 863 (1948); Moore v. United States, 2 F.2d 839, 842 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 267 U.S. 599 (1924).
97. United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974). In Barrett, the court
considered ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33-3 (1973) in determining the public official's duty.
98. United States v. Keane, No. 74 CR 359 (N.D. Ill.), appeal pending, No. 74-1979
(7th Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1974).
It is well established that a scheme to defraud a public entity and its citizens of the honest
and faithful services of a public official is within the reach of the mail fraud statute. United States
v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3184 (1974); United States v.
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THE ILLINOIS GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS ACT
The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act 99 has evidenced the state
legislature's concern for an honest and proper administration of
government. Although the preliminary portions of the act are aimed at
prevention of conflict of interest by state legislators,100 the most recent
enactment requiring disclosure of economic interests appears to be
more effective. 01 Article 4A102 applies economic disclosure regulations
to local government officials0 3 as well as all members in the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government. 0 4 These regulations
are emphatic0 5 and enforceable under criminal penalties. 06 The
Illinois Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the
Governmental Ethics Act held that the act which required different
types of economic interest disclosure from state officials, as distin-
guished from local officials, does not unconstitutionally discriminate
between persons of the same legislative class. 07
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that local prosecutors have the penal statutes
available to effectively deter conflict of interest official corruption in
Illinois. 0 In this post-"Watergate" era the time has come for public
States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
In United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1973), a buyer for Zenith Radio
Corporation was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 for scheming to defraud Zenith of his loyal and
faithful services by receiving kickbacks from a cabinet supplier. Zenith's conflict of interest policy
was admitted into evidence as bearing on the knowledge and intent of the defendants. This
reasoning was specifically applied in United States v. Keane to admit ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 102, §
3 (1973) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 3-14-4 (1973) as bearing on Keane's intent to defraud.
See United States v. Keane, supra.
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 601-101 etseq. (1973).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 601-101 to 603-304 (1973).
101. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 604A-101 through 604A-107 (1973) (enacted January
24, 1972).
102. Id.
103. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-101 (g), (h), (i) (1973).
104. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-101 (a), (b), (e) (1973).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127 § 604A-102(b) (I) (1973) provides that public officials shall
disclose land interests in excess of S5,000 or dividends in excess of $1,200. Section 604A-
102(b) (2) requires disclosure of any business entity where income is received in excess of
$1,200.
State officials must file the form statement of economic interests with the Secretary of State
as provided under section 604A-103. Local officials must file a form statement of economic
interests with the county clerk as provided under section 604A-104.
106. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (1973) provides that any person required to file
a statement of economic interest who wilfully files a false or incomplete statement is guilty of a
Class A misdemeanor.
107. Stein v. Howlett, 52 III. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972), dismissed, 412 U.S. 925
(1973).
108. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 3, 4 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 3-14-4, 3-14-5
(1973); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 4-8-6 (1973); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 33-3 (1973); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (1973).
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officials to be strictly accountable to the citizens they serve. County
state's attorneys should take cognizance that their office is the primary
safeguard the people retain against thwarting local corruption in public
office.
For whatever reasons, there is a total void of convictions in
conflict of interest cases, and it may be that the inherent complexities
attendant to conflict of interest crimes is the reason. 10 9 If the stagnation
continues, federal prosecutors will be compelled to assume an even
greater burden in convicting local officials for breach of the public
trust. 110
109. It is notable that in People v. Keane, No. 73-1409 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, 1973), a
criminal indictment brought by the Cook County State's Attorney charging violations of chapter
102, section 3 and chapter 38, section 33-3 was dismissed. This indictment charged two
aldermen with voting on city contracts to deposit city funds in Jefferson State Bank of which the
aldermen were stockholders. The trial judge entered a directed verdict for the defendants in this
bench trial. Note that this indictment 73-1409 entailed a wholly different conflict of interest as
that for which a federal conviction was obtained in United States v. Keane, No. 74 CR 359
(N.D. Ill.), appealpending, No. 74-1979 (7th Cir. 1974).
110. See note 9 supra.
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